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Scholars and practitioners in communications law and the First 
Amendment will recognize Lee Bollinger’s status as our most preeminent 
and thoughtful writer on press freedom. His latest effort, Uninhibited, 
Robust, and Wide-Open: A Free Press for a New Century,1 is a slim, 
elegant, and forceful piece of advocacy, taking its title from the most 
celebrated line in First Amendment jurisprudence,2 and perhaps in all of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate, Covington & Burling LLP. The Author practices in the areas of 
communications and media law and international freedom of expression, which involves 
representing media companies and domestic and international NGOs working on press 
issues around the world. The views expressed here are the Author’s alone. The Author 
would like to thank President Bollinger for helping him and countless others to better 
articulate the reasons we need a free press, as well as the tools we have to protect it. 
 1. LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A 
NEW CENTURY 162–63 (2010). 
 2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[W]e consider this 
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constitutional law.3 In the book, Bollinger turns his focus to international 
law, and on how “[t]o project a U.S. free press system onto the world,” 4 so 
as “to create a global system of a free press for the emerging global 
society.”5 In broad strokes, Bollinger offers a compelling argument for the 
need for universal free press principles in the era of globalization, as well 
as the means by which to achieve them. But in his argument’s particulars, 
Bollinger presents an incomplete analysis and an overriding irony. The 
incompleteness is in his failure to discuss a number of areas in which other 
countries’ conceptions of the press are irreconcilable with our own, or how 
to resolve these differences. And the irony is that many of the measures 
Bollinger proposes that other countries take in adopting First Amendment 
values would themselves likely not survive First Amendment scrutiny here 
in the United States. 
Part I of this Review will briefly describe Bollinger’s project, as well 
as his discussion of the First Amendment values that animate his vision of a 
global free press. Part II will raise some implementation problems 
associated with exporting the United States’ free press system that 
Bollinger fails to give their needed airing. Part III will discuss how 
comfortably Bollinger’s project rests with a vision of the First Amendment 
most recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the 2010 
decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission6—a vision that 
attaches constitutional importance to speech in its own right rather than to 
the values speech might serve, and that is agnostic as to a speaker’s identity 
or the content of the speaker’s message.7 Part IV concludes with a real-
world example that demonstrates some of the practical difficulties 
                                                                                                                 
case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 3. Ronald K.L. Collins, First Amendment Ctr., New York Times v. Sullivan: The Case 
That Changed First Amendment History, FREEDOM F., 
http://catalog.freedomforum.org/SpecialTopics/NYTSullivan/summary.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2011). 
 4. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 162–63. 
 5. Id. at 112. 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 7. As discussed more fully below, my use of the term “agnosticism” in discussing the 
Speech and Press Clauses intends to signify an interpretive principle that disavows the 
determinability of a particular “truth.” More simply, it values speech for its own sake, rather 
than for what that speech might say, who might be speaking, or the effects that speech may 
have on other speakers or listeners. I know the term is primarily used in religious philosophy 
to describe an individual who does not take a position as to the existence of a deity, or (more 
precisely) who believes there is a lack of sufficient proof to lead her to a conclusion on the 
matter. It has also been used to describe the Constitution. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Our 
Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120 (2008). For a use of the term that is closer to 
mine, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 392. 
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identified in this Review.  
I. “PROVIDING THE WORLD” A FREE AND INDEPENDENT PRESS 
Bollinger begins Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open by establishing 
three “pillars” of First Amendment jurisprudence—press protection from 
censorship, no special press rights of access, and press regulation—that 
shape and support the freedoms the press enjoys in the United States 
today.8 As to protection from censorship, Bollinger describes how the 
Supreme Court’s initial First Amendment cases addressed, at first 
“inauspicious[ly]” but then correctly, the problem of speech that advocated 
illegal action, caused reputational harm, invaded privacy, potentially 
prejudiced jurors, or divulged state secrets.9 These cases collectively stand 
for the proposition that the First Amendment, “underscored by a passion 
for a largely unbounded national forum,” protects a broad range of speech, 
including speech by the institutional press.10 The second pillar, in 
Bollinger’s view, represents a more lamentable line of cases—those that 
deny the press’s newsgathering activity any special constitutional 
protection.11 Accordingly, for example, there is no First Amendment right 
protecting the disclosure of a journalist’s confidential source or mandating 
access to a crime scene.12 Finally, the third pillar, “[r]egulating the [p]ress 
to [i]mprove the [p]ress,”13 affirms the authority of the FCC to impose 
limits on broadcaster speech and media ownership, protects public 
broadcasters’ speech rights despite their receipt of government subsidies, 
and declines to qualify the First Amendment rights of Internet speakers.14 
Turning to the rest of the world, Bollinger next argues that as 
globalization speeds on and the American press enters the global arena, it 
will be subject to a number of legal regimes that are well outside of the 
three pillars’ protection. Lese majesté laws that criminalize insults of royal 
family members and heads of state, overprotective or nonexistent access to 
information laws, website-censoring authoritarian regimes, and 
“bureaucratic licensing rules” that bar or frustrate foreign correspondents 
and media outlets all inhibit the free flow of information upon which we 
have become increasingly dependent in the Internet era.15 Bollinger 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 12–43 (deriving the three “pillars” from Supreme 
Court cases).   
 9. Id. at 13. 
 10. Id. at 24. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 25–27 (quotation omitted). 
 13. Id. at 29. 
 14. Id. at 29–42. 
 15. Id. at 89 (citing Jane Macartney, Time Out Magazine Banned by China’s Censors in 
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therefore proposes the need for “a central, overriding system of 
constitutional protections” “to provide a free and independent press to a 
world in desperate need of such an institution . . . .”16  
To implement this system, Bollinger calls on the U.S. Supreme Court 
to lead in the formation of a global free press by “draw[ing] on the 
language and concepts in current international conventions and laws,”17 
such as freedom-of-expression-affirming provisions in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and similar agreements.18 Doing so would 
establish freedom of expression not as a legal right granted by sovereignty, 
but rather a natural “right of individual citizens throughout the world.”19 He 
also calls for a number of other steps the United States should take in 
“nurtur[ing] a press focused on broader global issues,”20 such as using 
public funds to develop a “nationally sponsored media” similar to the BBC 
in its focus on international reporting.21 Finally, he explores the potential 
use of contractual relationships between nations, as manifested in 
international trade and investment law, to enforce global norms for a free 
press.22 By taking these actions, Bollinger claims, the United States can 
lead in developing increased protections for journalists and speakers 
worldwide, thus setting off a rising tide of freedom of expression that will 
lift all boats. 
II. THE “FREE PRESS” AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Bollinger acknowledges that there are a number of implementation 
problems associated with developing an uninhibited global marketplace of 
ideas. Most of these problems stem from the disparate levels of protection 
afforded to the press for its speech here in the United States and abroad. 
For example, Bollinger mentions the problem of libel tourism, where 
defamation plaintiffs seek redress against authors and journalists in 
jurisdictions such as England, where the burden is on the writer to show 
truth rather than on the plaintiff to show falsity, as is the case in the United 
States.23 For obvious reasons, Internet publishing has become a boon to 
libel plaintiffs. Fortunately, however, domestic courts have refused to apply 
                                                                                                                 
Run Up to Olympics, TIMESONLINE (June 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4113093.ece). 
 16. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 105. 
 17. Id. at 118.  
 18. Id. at 118–19. 
 19. Id. at 119.  
 20. Id. at 131.  
 21. Id. at 134. 
 22. Id. at 145–153. 
 23. Id. at 96–97. 
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the law of these countries or enforce their judgments, finding them 
inconsistent with the First Amendment. In Bachchan v. India Abroad 
Publications Inc., for example, a New York state trial court held that 
England’s lack of a First Amendment equivalent meant that “[t]he 
protection to free speech and the press embodied in that amendment would 
be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments granted 
pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered 
antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”24 
But Britain has shown some interest in statutory fixes to its libel regime 
that would raise plaintiffs’ burden of proof and create a speech-protective 
qualified public interest privilege.25 Additionally, over the past ten years, 
many countries have decriminalized libel, or at least removed the prospect 
of imprisonment for publication crimes.26 So, in this sense, the United 
States’ more protective model of speech rights is already taking hold, or at 
least being considered, in other parts of the world. 
But there are other areas where the incompatibility between other 
countries’ conceptions of a free press and our own is far more intractable, 
in part because the same justifications—or “pillars”—lead other countries 
to draw opposite conclusions than those reached here in the United States. 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. County Sup. 
Ct. 1992); see also Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005 (refusing to enforce a French libel judgment that was “incompatible” with 
the First Amendment); Ellis v. Time, Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-1755, 1997 WL 863267, at *13 
(D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1997) (prohibiting application of British libel law); Matusevitch v. 
Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to enforce British libel judgment); 
Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515 (LLS), 1994 WL 419847, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994 (finding that “establishment of a claim under the British law of 
defamation would be antithetical to the First Amendment protections accorded the 
defendants”).   
 25. See, e.g., Libel Law: Improving a Reputation, THE ECONOMIST (May 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16219883. The proposed bill, introduced in 
May of 2010 by Lord Anthony Lester in the House of Lords, can be found at Defamation 
Bill, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [55] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldbills/003/11003.1-7.html#j01.  
 26. Countries that have decriminalized defamation in the past decade include Ukraine 
(2001), Ghana (2001), Sri Lanka (2002), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999), Georgia (2004), 
Moldova (2004), Ireland (2009), Romania (2009), and the United Kingdom (2009). See, 
e.g., ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., LIBEL AND INSULT LAWS: A MATRIX ON 
WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE 34, 63, 107, 165 (2005); 
Helsinki Comm’n Hearing on the Threats to Free Media in the OSCE Region, 6 (June 9, 
2010) (statement of Dunja Mijatovic, Rep. on Freedom of the Media, Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe), http://www.osce.org/fom/68432; Alexis Arieff, 
Senegal: Freedom … With Limits, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jun. 6, 2005), 
http://www.cpj.org/reports/2005/06/senegal-05.php; Indian Government Takes First Step 
Toward Decriminalizing Defamation, GLOBAL JOURNALIST (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.globaljournalist.org/worldwatch/2011/02/india/indian-government-takes-first-
step-toward-decriminalizing-defamation/.   
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For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has found rights of reply in the print 
context to be facially incompatible with the First Amendment. In Miami 
Herald v. Tornillo, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, 
noted that “implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of 
access”—particularly because it required “governmental coercion” for its 
implementation—“at once brings about a confrontation with the express 
provisions of the First Amendment” and could not be reconciled with the 
guarantee of a free press.27 But nearly every democracy outside of the 
United States grants story subjects either a constitutional or statutory 
right—implemented by “government coercion” (and by “government 
coercion” I mean only law, just as the Tornillo Court meant it)—to reply to 
print stories written about them.28 So too does the American Convention on 
Human Rights, an international human rights instrument which Bollinger 
advocates the United States should ratify.29 In addition, tribunals applying 
the international freedom of expression law upon which Bollinger seeks to 
rely have read a right of reply into nominally press-protective agreements 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights.30 According to these 
tribunals, one justification for doing so is that a right of reply ensures a 
diversity of opinion on matters of public interest.31 
There are other examples. Even though the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights found the licensing of journalists to be incompatible with 
freedom of expression back in 1985, a number of countries in the world, 
including a few countries that have submitted to that court’s jurisdiction, 
impose some form of licensing regime for domestic or foreign journalists, 
newspapers, or the importation of books and films.32 So too do some of the 
international conventions Bollinger characterizes as speech-protective.33 
Foreign investment in media outlets is not nearly as universal a free-press 
principle as Bollinger describes; he bemoans limitations India has placed 
on ownership stakes in its newspapers as limiting the free flow of 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974). 
 28. See, e.g., Kyu Ho Youm, The Right of Reply and Freedom of the Press: An 
International and Comparative Perspective, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1017, 1018–20 (2008). 
 29. American Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
9 I.L.M. 99; see also BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 143. 
 30. See, e.g., Melnychuk v. Ukraine, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 6–7. 
 31. Id. at 7; see also Ediciones Tiempo S.A. v. Spain, App. No. 13010/87, 62 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247, 254 (1989). 
 32. See, e.g., Mark Fitzgerald, Latin America Continues to ‘License’ Journalists, 
EDITOR & PUBLISHER (Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Headlines/latin-
america-continues-to-license-journalists-58922-.aspx.     
 33. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights allows for licensing of 
“cinema enterprises.” See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
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information across borders, for example, without acknowledging that the 
United States imposes similar limitations in the broadcast sector.34 These 
are difficult problems. By failing to address them, Bollinger’s roadmap for 
implementing a worldwide First Amendment takes a view from too high a 
level. 
Given that these compatibility issues are mostly ones of sovereignty, 
Bollinger naturally must rely for the most part on judges’ interpretation of 
law, rather than on legislatures’ promulgation or on executives’ 
implementation of it. After all, the Third Soviet Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. included not only the right to “freedom of speech [and] of the 
press,” but also the right to “develop[] television and radio, . . . book 
publishing and periodic press.”35 But how can press-protective principles 
be “imported,” as Bollinger calls it, by other jurisdictions and adopted as 
rules of decision in their own courts? Will it be through the 
“encouragement” Bollinger believes will come if the United States subjects 
itself to the “international oversight” of human rights law?36 Bollinger 
recognizes the enforceability problems with international instruments such 
as Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which 
state a right to “seek,” “receive,” and “impart” information.37 He declines 
to mention, however, that the ICCPR seems to not serve as much of a 
deterrent to countries like Egypt, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and Somalia, 
which have been parties to the Covenant for decades and have been jailing 
journalists for almost as long.38 If some countries continue to repress the 
press despite their status as parties to Article 19, it is difficult to see why 
they would act any differently in the face of encouragement from the 
United States, let alone follow its example.39 
                                                                                                                 
 34. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 89–90; 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1996) (forbidding the grant of 
station licenses to various foreign entities or domestic corporations with substantial foreign 
ownership). 
 35. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] arts. 50, 46. 
 36. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 144. 
 37. Id. at 118–19. 
 38. See, e.g., Egypt Journalists Get Jail Terms, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5118876.stm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); Louise Hallman, 
Venezuelan Journalist Fined, Jailed and Banned from Working, After Accusing Mayor of 
Nepotism, INT’L PRESS INST. (June 18, 2010), http://www.freemedia.at/singleview/4999/; 
Two Journalists Get Long Jail Terms in Human Rights Crackdown, REPORTERS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (Aug. 25, 2006), http://arabia.reporters-sans-
frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=18660; Somali Journalist Jailed for Airing Interview, 
RTÉ NEWS, http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/0814/somalia.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
 39. Bollinger also calls for the Supreme Court to “develop a broader newsgathering 
right in the context of international or global government actions.” BOLLINGER, supra note 
1, at 125. But he gives no insight as to how such a right would be defined or enforced. To 
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III. EXPORTING THE AGNOSTIC FIRST AMENDMENT 
At its core, Bollinger’s project is one of international law, and it 
should be judged as such. But the project’s animating principle is a 
particular vision of the First Amendment’s protection of the press. It is thus 
worthwhile to consider whether the current First Amendment can support 
the weight Bollinger asks it to bear. The Supreme Court’s most robust 
discussion of the First Amendment’s application to the media in recent 
years—and the most definitive declaration of First Amendment principles 
by the Roberts Court—came in a campaign finance case, last term’s 
Citizens United. Like the examples discussed above, the case implies some 
incompatibility between the First Amendment’s present meaning and the 
First Amendment Bollinger seeks to export to the rest of the world. 
The statute at issue in Citizens United, which barred corporations and 
unions from spending general treasury funds on a broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication mentioning a candidate within sixty days of a 
general election or thirty days of a primary election, included an express 
carve-out for media companies.40 In finding the statute unconstitutional, the 
majority overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,41 which 
upheld a Michigan state statute that prohibited corporations from using 
treasury money to support or oppose candidates in elections because of 
corporations’ potentially corruptive influence on elections, made possible 
through the accumulation of wealth effectuated by the corporate form. As 
support for rejecting Austin, both the majority and the concurrence noted 
that under Austin’s theory of the First Amendment, large media 
corporations enjoyed protection to speak about elections under the 
statute—including endorsements—only as a matter of legislative grace. 
Justice Kennedy, for example, stated that the rationale relied upon in Austin 
“could ban political speech of media corporations,” and “wealthy media 
corporations could have their voices diminished to put them on par with 
other media entities.”42 In concurring, Chief Justice Roberts similarly 
argued that the rationale would “apply most directly to newspapers and 
other media corporations,” because “[t]hey have a more profound impact 
                                                                                                                 
take one example, Bollinger’s proposed right would seem to allow a U.S. journalist working 
in Iraq to demand access to a meeting in Duhok between the U.S. Secretary of State and the 
head of the Kurdish Regional Government. One wonders what court the journalist would go 
to when the Diplomatic Security Service bars him from the meeting room, or what type of 
relief the journalist would seek after being barred. In the end, even if speech is no longer 
limited by borders, jurisdiction continues to be.  
 40. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (citing 2 
U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006)). 
 41. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 42. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 905. 
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on public discourse than most other speakers.”43   
As a matter of Press Clause jurisprudence, however, the majority and 
concurring Justices’ concerns about the media’s speech rights are red 
herrings. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, Austin itself 
distinguished media endorsements from speech-related expenditures by 
other corporations.44 More importantly, however, in their rush to defend the 
rights of the press, neither Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion nor the 
Chief Justice’s concurrence makes any mention of the long line of 
precedent that would find unconstitutional a statute barring press discussion 
of election-related speech during the period leading up to a primary 
election—a principle that Justice Kennedy himself recognized in Austin.45 
A statute that sought to “ban political speech of media corporations”46 by, 
for example, prohibiting newspapers or television stations from spending 
funds to pay for endorsement-associated expenses would run afoul of the 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue47 
and Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland48 line of cases, which would 
find the statute had impermissible “censorial effects” that would “deter the 
exercise of First Amendment rights.”49 Mills v. Alabama held that statutes 
that do not single out the press but still have the effect of “punish[ing] a 
newspaper editor for doing no more than publishing an editorial on election 
day urging people to vote a particular way in the election” violate the First 
Amendment,50 which directly refutes the concerns of the majority and 
concurrence. A prosecution for violating any such “ban” would likely be 
subjected to Sullivan’s actual malice standard for laws regarding speech 
concerning public officials.51 In addition, the government’s attempts to 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 976 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the Michigan statute at issue in Austin 
included an exemption for media companies that the Court upheld against an equal 
protection challenge. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666–68. It thus makes little sense to find that 
Austin’s rationale would allow the prosecution of media companies for political speech 
when Austin itself addressed and rejected the possibility. 
 45. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 712 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is beyond peradventure 
that the media could not be prohibited from speaking about candidate qualifications. The 
First Amendment would not tolerate a law prohibiting a newspaper or television network 
from spending on political comment because it operates through a corporation.”) (citing 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1966)) (emphasis added).   
 46. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 905.  
 47. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 48. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
 49. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 588 (internal quotation omitted). 
 50. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (finding punishment of newspaper endorsement author under 
Alabama Corrupt Practices Act violated First Amendment). 
 51. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67–75 (1964) (citing New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)) (discussing that the Constitution limits state 
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enjoin a media outlet from making an endorsement prior to an election 
pursuant to enforcing such a ban would be struck down as a prior 
restraint.52  
If these hypothetical prosecutions sound like they are far off from any 
First Amendment world that you might recognize, it is because they are. By 
exposing the press to harms it does not face and extending protections to 
the press that it does not need, Citizens United’s high-spirited defense of 
the institutional media is, in the end, mostly smoke and mirrors. But the 
case does stand for a proposition that is relevant to Bollinger’s project: the 
notion that the value of the First Amendment lies in its protection of the act 
of speech, regardless of its content. This content agnosticism has its roots in 
a number of Supreme Court Press Clause opinions, many of which 
Bollinger identifies. Examples include Justice Brennan’s separate opinion 
in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, which noted that even if the press were 
“arrogant, tyrannical, abusive, and sensationalist, . . . the decision of what, 
when, and how to publish is for editors, not judges,”53 and Justice 
Douglas’s dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, in which he denounced the 
“amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be balanced against 
other needs or conveniences of government.”54 
This agnosticism is in tension with another First Amendment value 
that the Speech and Press Clauses have long been thought to serve and 
upon which Bollinger heavily relies: the public’s right to know. In Pell v. 
Procunier, for example, the Court found that reporters had no First 
Amendment-based right to have face-to-face interviews with prison 
inmates.55 Three Justices dissented, basing their disagreement not on the 
reporter’s right to conduct the interview or even write the story, but rather 
on the public’s right to read it: “[The prison’s ban on press interviews with 
                                                                                                                 
power to impose sanctions for speech concerning public officials to those statements made 
with actual malice). 
 52. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). It also bears 
mentioning that despite the Citizens United majority’s clarion call for press freedom, one 
member seems unperturbed at the possibility of depriving the institutional press of its 
previously recognized First Amendment rights. See, e.g., John W. Dean, Justice Scalia’s 
Thoughts, and a Few of My Own, on New York Times v. Sullivan, FINDLAW (Dec. 2, 2005), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051202.html (quoting Justice Scalia as implying that 
New York Times v. Sullivan was wrongly decided). But to the degree Justice Scalia criticized 
Sullivan for granting the press special privileges, the interpretation underlying his criticism 
is inconsistent with his own opinions. See id. (quoting Scalia as stating “[t]he press is the 
only business that is not held responsible for its negligence”); Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 927–28 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the 
Press Clause protects printing, not the institutional press). 
 53. 427 U.S. 539, 613 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 54. 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 55. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
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inmates] is an unconstitutional infringement on the public’s right to know 
protected by the free press guarantee of the First Amendment.”56 Relatedly, 
Red Lion upheld the now-discarded Fairness Doctrine against a First 
Amendment challenge from a broadcaster who claimed it infringed on his 
speech rights.57 The Court rejected the broadcaster’s claim that the 
Doctrine constituted forced speech, because in the scarce speech context of 
radio, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the 
broadcasters, which is paramount.”58 
Red Lion demonstrates the tension between a First Amendment theory 
that values speakers and one that values the receipt of speech. If the value 
of speech is in an uninhibited right to speak, then a listener’s right to 
receive the speech will always be satisfied; this is so because the 
fulfillment of the listener’s right is a result to be produced, rather than an 
independent value that needs its own protection. If, on the other hand, a 
speaker can be deemed to cause interference in some way with the greater 
value of listeners’ receipt of speech, then the speaker’s right could 
theoretically be diminished. To apply Citizens United’s agnostic theory to 
an extreme case, constitutional values should be untroubled if a corporation 
or union bought every available advertisement on every available 
broadcasting station and newspaper in a particular market. The Citizens 
United dissenters, however, would view this result as trampling on a 
value—the public’s right to hear all sides of political debates—that the 
First Amendment was intended to preserve. Another, more realistic, 
example demonstrating the tension is the Fairness Doctrine. A First 
Amendment agnostic would find the doctrine unconstitutional on its face 
for its forcing of speech onto broadcasters, while a consequentialist like 
Bollinger would balance the harms it causes in suppressing speech against 
its benefits in facilitating the airing of many sides of a given issue. Indeed, 
Bollinger expressly calls for the Fairness Doctrine’s return.59   
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 57. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 58. Id. at 390. 
 59. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 126. For a seeming rejection of the 
consequentialist approach, see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
(“[The First Amendment] does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad 
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a 
judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.”). The same Justices who decided Stevens by an 8–1 vote later split 5–4 
in Citizens United. But there is little doubt that the Justices dissenting in Citizens United 
engaged in an “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” of corporate speech. 
Id. Perhaps the Citizens United dissenters are more accurately described as fainthearted 
agnostics who balance only when they view the First Amendment costs as sufficiently 
significant. 
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This tension is more than academic, especially for Bollinger’s project. 
While Citizens United casts the majority of the current Supreme Court as 
free speech agnostics, Bollinger is firmly entrenched in the consequentialist 
camp. In setting out a “framework for how to think about the press . . . in 
the twenty-first century,”60 he advocates requiring broadcasters “to sell 
time” and “provide a certain amount” of free on-air time “to those wishing 
to express their views about public issues” and requiring or encouraging 
“broadcasters to cover international and global issues,” despite decades of 
court and FCC precedent barring the imposition of such requirements.61 He 
calls for significant, systematic public investment in media outlets, 
including federal subsidies for foreign bureaus, and says courts should have 
the power to force cable systems to carry foreign news channels such as Al 
Jazeera in English.62 In addition, he argues that the First Amendment may 
even “require” the government to disperse media ownership in the interest 
of maintaining a free press,63 a position supported by a number of the 
international judicial bodies with which Bollinger seeks affinity.64  
Whether these policies would result in a demonstrably better or freer 
media is beside the present point (though I have my doubts). What they 
undoubtedly express, however, is a content preference, and a determination 
on Bollinger’s part that some decisions as to what media cover should not 
be left entirely to individual editorial discretion. Further, based on these 
speech proscriptions in the name of a greater good, there is no reason to 
believe Bollinger would find rights of reply incompatible with the First 
Amendment values he seeks to export—in other words, Bollinger would 
seem to think that Tornillo was wrongly decided.65 One therefore cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 60.  BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 115. 
 61.  Id. at 128–29; see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585 (1981) 
(upholding the FCC’s policy statement in which it concluded that FCC review of program 
formats does not serve the public interest); Univision Comm. Inc., Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5842, para. 28 (2007) (“[With rare exception,] licensees are 
afforded broad discretion in the scheduling, selection and presentation of programs aired on 
their stations, and the Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of the station 
regarding programming matters.”). 
 62.  See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 130–37. 
 63.  Id. at 60. 
 64. See, e.g., Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, 276 Eur. Ct. H.R. 6, ¶¶ 38–44 
(1993); see also Written Comments of the Open Society Justice Initiative at ¶¶ 4–13, 17–31, 
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. v. Italy, App. No. 38433/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (March 2010) (quoting a 
number of European court decisions holding, inter alia, that “state regulation will likely 
continue to be constitutionally required to safeguard pluralism of viewpoints and freedom of 
broadcasting”). 
 65. Bollinger reconciles Red Lion and Tornillo in Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open 
and elsewhere by arguing that “under the First Amendment it is not necessary that all 
communication technologies be structured identically, that there are merits to having 
multiple approaches to a vigorous press, and that having multiple approaches yields benefits 
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help but wonder if Bollinger’s actual vision of the First Amendment, at 
least in part, is that of a Western European consequentialist rather than of 
an American agnostic, which is an odd mindset for a Press Clause exporter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I end with an anecdote that I believe demonstrates the difficulties of 
implementing Bollinger’s vision in the way he suggests. In February 2007, 
I represented a team of media scholars and practitioners working on a press 
reform project in Rwanda, where fifteen years earlier media outlets had 
facilitated and encouraged genocide, first by spreading divisionist ideology 
and then by reading out the names and hiding places of Tutsis who were 
taking cover from machete-wielding Hutu genocidaires.66   
The draft media law my colleagues and I had reviewed as part of this 
reform project contained a number of expression-unfriendly measures, 
including a licensing requirement for journalists. Like any good free speech 
advocate, I told the regulators, legislators, and cabinet members with whom 
I met that such a requirement was inimical to freedom of expression. One 
minister listened, politely waited for me to finish, and responded to my 
soliloquy with a question. 
“Is it correct that your country requires you, as an attorney, to be 
licensed?” 
“Yes,” I replied. 
“And what of doctors? Are they required to be licensed as well?” 
“Yes,” I responded again. Like any able attorney, I attempted to parry 
the minister’s point with a distinction. “But I need licensure as an attorney, 
because if I make a mistake, someone can lose money or be imprisoned. 
And a doctor needs licensure because if he makes a mistake, someone 
could die.” 
“And what is the difference between your American doctor and a 
Rwandan journalist?” 
The minister’s attempt at enlightenment did not trigger in me a full 
consequentialist conversion, and subsequent actions by the Rwandan 
government have demonstrated that self-preservation, more than national 
                                                                                                                 
of experimentation . . . .” BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 129. See generally LEE C. 
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1997). In addition to being a classically 
consequentialist statement, it is difficult to see how the press can take much comfort in a 
First Amendment that follows “multiple approaches.” 
 66. For more information on the Rwandan genocide and the media’s role in it, see 
generally THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (Allan Thompson ed., 2007). For more 
information on the Rwandan Media Reform Project, see We Wish to Inform You, ON THE 
MEDIA (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.onthemedia.org 
/transcripts/2007/03/23/04 (click on “Download MP3” or press the “Play” icon). 
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security, may explain the motivation behind its suppression of the press.67 
But his argument demonstrates that media law, like any other body of law, 
is a product of context, and efforts to reform it in individual countries must 
take that context into account. Press protection in the United States can be a 
beacon in completing that important work, but it cannot be the sole 
yardstick against which those countries’ efforts will be measured.   
Even if Bollinger’s prescriptions for a global free press are in the end 
not fully formed or argued, he performs a great service by articulating the 
links between a free press, democratic stability, and self-fulfillment, and by 
placing these links alongside those interconnecting the modern world. 
Freedom of information, as he notes, is not only “the key to securing other 
rights and to serving other ends”—it also both “prevent[s] the worst of 
human tragedies . . . and . . . make[s] the most of human relationships.”68 
This is so because, as Bollinger demonstrates, “in general people behave 
better when they know more.”69 Bollinger’s sanguine and insightful book 
reminds us that even in today’s vast, differentiated, but interconnected 
world, liberty, stability, and democracy ride in on the front pages of 
newspapers, over the broadcast airwaves, and across the network of the 
Internet—and not on the backs of bombs.   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See, e.g., Rwanda Shuts Critical Papers in Run-up to Presidential Vote, COMMITTEE 
TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://cpj.org/2010/04/rwanda-shuts-critical-
papers-in-run-up-to-presiden.php. 
 68.  BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 113, 115. 
 69. Id. at 113. 
